Abstract: Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the hardness of factoring. We define a new notion of bounded rationality, where the payoffs of players are discounted by the computation time they take to produce their actions. We use this notion to give a direct correspondence between the existence of equilibria where Alice has a winning strategy and the hardness of factoring. Namely, under a natural assumption on the discount rates, there is an equilibrium where Alice has a winning strategy iff there is a linear-time samplable distribution with respect to which Factoring is hard on average. We also give general results for discounted games over countable action spaces, including showing that any game with bounded and computable payoffs has an equilibrium in our model, even if each player is allowed a countable number of actions. It follows, for example, that the Largest Integer game has an equilibrium in our model though it has no Nash equilibria or ǫ-Nash equilibria.
Introduction
Game theory studies the strategic behavior of selfinterested rational agents when they interact. In the traditional setting of game theory, agents are supposed to be perfectly rational, in terms of knowing what their strategic options and the consequences of choosing these options are, as well as being able to model perfectly the rationality of other agents with whom they interact. However, often in practice, when human beings are involved in a strategic game-playing situation, they fail to make perfectly rational decisions. Herbert Simon first developed this "bounded rationality" perspective.
In the past couple of decades various models of bounded rationality [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] have been defined and studied by game theorists and computer scientists. In this paper, we introduce a new notion of bounded rationality based on the perspective of computational complexity. We argue that it is natural, and prove that it has some nice properties and can be used to obtain new connections between game theory and computational complexity.
The main idea is to discount the payoffs of players in a game based on how much time they take to play their actions, with different players possibly discounted at different rates. Of course, we need to define what it means for a player to take time to play its action. This naturally pre-supposes that each player has some computational mechanism for playing its strategy -in this paper, as in the recent work by Halpern and Pass [7] , we adopt the probabilistic Turing machine as our computational model. This is a computational model which is universal, and is also generally considered to be realizable in Nature. Furthermore, it capture complexity via running time and can be used to realize games with countable action spaces, unlike say if we were to use finite automata: the model typically considered by game theorists when studying bounded rationality.
In this paper, we use exponential discounting, meaning that the payoff goes down by a factor (1 − δ) t after time t, where δ is a constant. Our main results also hold for other notions of discounting, as we discuss in Section 1.2.
The notion of discounting is far from new [8, 9 , 10] -indeed much of economic theory depends on it. It is a basic economic assumption that people value a dollar a year from now less than a dollar today. The discount 1 − δ for a specific period is chosen so that an agent is indifferent between receiving 1 − δ dollars now and 1 dollar at the end of the period.
Discounting is commonly used for computing cumulative payoffs in repeated games. We emphasize that we discount based on computation time, which means that the notion of discounting can now even be used for one-shot games even when there is no natural notion of input size. The idea of discounting based on computation time was developed by Fortnow [11] , where he used it for a variaton on the "program equilibria" framework devloped by Tennenholtz [12] ; moreover, a single discount rate is used for all players.
Our notion of discounted time has several benefits. First, it bounds rationality endogenously rather than ex-ogenously. By this, we mean that the bound on an agent's rationality is not imposed from outside, but rather arises from the agent's own need to maximize its utility.
Second, discounting has some nice mathematical properties. It's time-independent -discounting for r steps starting at a time t 0 yields the same relative decrease in payoff as discounting for r steps starting at an earlier or later time. Given a discount factor 1 − δ, the discounted payoff behaves like a linear function for small t and like an exponential function for large t, which accords well with our intuitions for how we value computational resources in the real world. We might only be marginally more gratified by a computational task finishing in 1 second than one finishing in 2 seconds, but we would certainly be far more annoyed if a task finished in 20 minutes than in 10 minutes.
Also, the discounting model is philosophically elegant in that it unifies time as viewed by economists and time as viewed by computer scientists. Time is an important concept both in economics and in computational complexity, and we model it in a way that is consistent with the perspectives of both fields.
We use asymmetric discounting in our model -different players may have different discount factors. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, players might have asymmetric roles in a game, and in this case it is natural to give them discount factors. For example, a cryptographic protocol can be interpreted as a game where players are either honest or adversarial. In this setting, it makes sense to model the adversary as more patient and therefore having discount rate δ closer to 1.
However, even if all the players are equally patient with respect to real time, it still makes sense to give them different discount factors. This is because discounting is done as a function of computational time rather than real time, and the relationship between computational time and real time depends on the power of technology. If one player has a much faster computer than the others, then it is effectively more patient, in that it has a smaller discount factor. For example, consider a two-player game where the players are equally patient in that the payoff for each player halves after 1 second of real time. Suppose, however, that Player 1 has a computer with a clock rate of 10 6 operations per second, and Player 2 has a computer with a clock rate of 10 12 operations per second. Then the discount rate δ 1 for Player 1 is approximately 10 −6 and the discount rate δ 2 for Player 2 is approximately 10 −12 . This is a further advantage of our model, in that it factors in the power of technology. Many games today play out in a virtual setting, eg. the game between someone sending their credit card information and a malicious adversary seeking to steal their identity, or an electronic auction, or even computer chess. In all these cases, the power of technology has a critical impact on strategy and success in the game, which is not modeled adequately by traditional game theory. Not only do we model this via the discount rates, but our notion of uniform equilibrium also implicitly models how technology evolves with time.
Our model exhibits some nice phenomena for general classes of games. We define a new notion of equilibrium for our model, which we call "uniform equilibrium". We show that for finite games, there's a uniform equilibrium corresponding to every Nash equilibrium. For games where each player has a countable action space, the situation is even more interesting. It's known that Nash equilibria do not exist in general in this case. However, under mild assumptions, namely that the payoffs are bounded and computable, we show that uniform equilibria always exist even in this case.
As an example, consider the Largest Integer game, where each player outputs a number and the player outputting the largest number wins the entire pot of money at stake (with the players sharing the pot equally if they output the same number). This is an archetypal example of a game which has no Nash equilibria or even approximate Nash equilibria. The absence of Nash equilibria means that traditional game theory provides no predictive or explanatory framework for how the game will actually play out.
The Largest Integer game does have a uniform equilibrium in our framework, and there is an intuitive explanation of this. Essentially, the Largest Integer game models oneupmanship, where each player is trying to outdo the other. What is not modeled by traditional game theory is that the players expend considerable resources in this process, which affects their "effective payoff". Indeed, as more and more resources are required, at some point the players become essentially indifferent between winning and losing. In our case, the resource is time; the equilibrium situation corresponds to both players spending so much time coming up with and writing down a large number that their payoffs are driven to zero by their discount factors.
The Factoring Game
Perhaps the most interesting results in this paper concern a close relationship between equilibria in discounted games and the computational complexity of problems. We illustrate this using the Factoring game.
The Factoring game is a puzzle in the theory of bounded rationality. Consider the following game between two players Alice and Bob. Alice sends an integer n 2 to Bob, who attempts to find its prime factorization. If Bob succeeds, he "wins" -he gets a large payoff and Alice gets a small payoff; if he fails, the opposite happens.
If formulated as a game in the conventional way, Bob always has a winning strategy. However, in practice, one would expect Alice to win, since factoring is be-lieved to be computationally hard. This is the puzzle: to find a natural formulation of the game that captures the intuition that Alice should win if factoring is indeed computationally hard.
The Factoring game was first introduced by BenSasson, Kalai and Kalai [13] and also considered by Halpern and Pass [7] . Neither gives an explicit solution to the puzzle, instead they give general frameworks in which to study games with computational costs. Indeed, Ben-Sasson, Kalai and Kalai say in the Future Work section of their paper that "it would be interesting to make connections between asymptotic algorithmic complexity and games".
We show that the structure of equilibrium payoffs in the discounted time version of the game corresponds closely to the computational complexity of factoring. Specifically, if Factoring is in probabilistic polynomial time on average, Bob always wins; if not, there are equilibria in which Alice gets a large payoff. This result assumes that the discount rates of the two players are polynomially related -we motivate this assumption in Section 4. If there's a different relationship between the discount rates, then there's a corresponding different complexity assumption which characterizes when Alice has a winning strategy. In the simplest interpretation of our model, where discount rates are determined by the power of technology, it can be empirically tested how discount rates vary with each other.
What makes this connection with asymptotic complexity somewhat surprising is that the notion of input length is not explicitly present in our model. Instead, it arises naturally from the discounting criterion and our notion of uniform equilibrium.
The Factoring game is relevant not only to game theory, but also to the foundations of cryptography. There has been a lot of research into the connections between game theory and cryptography [14, 15] , but much of this has focused on multi-party computation. One can define an analogue of the Factoring game for any oneway function and obtain similar results; there's nothing special about Factoring being used in the proofs. This game-theoretic perspective might be useful in studying the tradeoff between efficiency of encryption and security in cryptosystems. In general, it would be interesting to investigate a perspective where the success of a cryptosystem depends on the adversary being "bounded rational" rather than computationally bounded in some specific sense.
Further Discussion of the Model
Here, we further discuss various features of our model and compare it to alternative ones.
Our criteria for a reasonable model is that it should be general, i.e., be relevant to a class of situations rather than a single specific situation, and that it should have explanatory power, i.e., not only should it simply correspond to an observed phenomenon but provide some further insight. For comparative purposes, in the context of the Factoring game, one can think of some alternative models that predict a win for Alice. For example, one could imagine that the players have a fixed finite amount of time to make a decision, with Alice given say 10 seconds to choose her number, and Bob 100 seconds to respond with the prime factors. It's clear that if Bob can't factor a random large number (which could be generated quickly by Alice), he loses, however this is an unsatisfactory model in many respects. First, it deals with a very specific situation, so it cannot say anything about computational complexity or how equilibria depend on the power of technology. Second, the model is inherently non-robust. Bob might be able to factor Alice's number in 101 seconds -in a real-life situation, this difference shouldn't affect his payoff too much, but in this model, it does. By adopting a flexible model of bounded rationality, where payoffs degrade continuously with time, we avoid such pathological effects.
One way to make the fixed-time model more general is quantify over the time limit: to say, for example, that if Alice is allowed t units of time, then Bob is allowed t 2 units of time. This kind of approach is taken when formulating the notion of "computational equilibrium" [14, 16] where they limit the set of machines being used to those that run in some security parameter where our model makes no such restriction on machines but control time with utility. Another problem with the computational equilibrium model is that though it might be consistent with the observed phenomenon, it's unclear why the assumptions the model makes should hold. In such a case, the model is simply a way to re-formulate a phenomenon, rather than an explanation for it. In contrast, in our model, there are clear motivations for the choices made. Discounting is based on time preference of utility, which is well established and extensively used in economics [10] . Also our interpretation of discount rates in terms of the power of current technology matches the intuition that a player armed with a more powerful computer should be able to make a more rational decision, i.e., more in its self-interest. Finally, our use of asymmetric discount rates models asymmetries in the roles of players and in the power of technology available to them.
Regarding some of the more specific choices made, one could question why we use exponential discounting rather than some other form of discounting. Exponential discounting is still the discounting model of choice in economics and game theory, but there have been arguments made that other models such as "hyperbolic discounting" more accurately represent human time preference of utility [10] . As it turns out, the exact choice of discounting model does not matter very much to us -our main results on the Factoring game and the general result on bounded-payoff games (Theorems 3, 1 and 7) go through even in the hyperbolic discounting model and, we suspect, in any reasonable model of discounting.
Another issue which can be debated is whether each player's utility is discounted only by its own computational time or by some function of its computational time and the computational time of the other players. In a strategic situation, it seems natural to penalize a player only for its own computation. Consider a twoplayer simultaneous-move game, where each player plays without knowledge of the other player's action. Suppose Player 1 plays first in this game. Should Player 1 be charged for Player 2's time as well, since the outcome is determined only after Player 2 has played? We think not, since Player 1 can use its extra time doing other things, garnering utility in other ways. Of course, if one player plays first, that might seem to "sequentialize" the game. For our model to apply, there has to be a mechanism in place to ensure that the players do in fact act independently.
Our model can, in principle, deal with both positive and negative payoffs -discounting predicts, as seems intuitive, that positive payoffs should motivate agents to play quickly, while negative payoffs should cause agents to procrastinate. However, in this paper, we deal only with games with positive payoffs. This is because it's tricky to define what happens if the first player's computation finishes within a finite time but the second player's strategy computation never halts. In some sense, this corresponds to the second player not playing the game at all. With strictly positive payoffs, we can be guaranteed that in an equilibrium situation, all players will play within a finite time -it is in the interest of all players to play as quickly as possible. A way to avoid the issue with positivity of payoffs would be to give players preference orderings on outcomes rather than ascribing real payoffs, as is often done in game theory [17] , and have the preference orderings vary with computational time. Though perhaps a more accurate model, this has the disadvantage of being very cumbersome mathematically.
Related Work
Bounded rationality is a rich area, with lots of work in the past couple of decades. We survey some of that work and clarify the relationship to our ideas, with an emphasis on more recent work. There are several excellent surveys and references on bounded rationality [3, 18, 19, 20] .
Early work focused mainly on bounded rationality in the context of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, where strategies are modeled as finite automata [1, 2, 5, 21] . There were some works during this period which modeled strategies by Turing machines [4, 22] , but these works were concerned with Turing machine size as a complexity measure rather than time.
There has also been a good deal of work in the economics literature studying the consequences for economics of the constraint that agents act in computable ways [3, 23, 24] , but these works do not deal with computational complexity.
Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in modeling strategies as general Turing machines. We note especially the two papers [7, 13] which discuss the Factoring game. Rather than specifying an explicit solution to the puzzle of the Factoring game, these works provide general frameworks and results for taking computational costs into account when playing games. Our contribution in this paper is in providing a concrete and natural model which captures the cost of computational time, and using it to solve the Factoring puzzle.
Other recent works [11, 12] consider computer programs as strategies, but in the context of a different kind of equilibrium known as the program equilibrium, where rationality is modeled by letting each player's program have as input the code of the other player's program. As mentioned earlier, Fortnow [11] considers discounted computation time in this context to obtain a broader range of program equilibria rather than to model bounded rationality, and he allows only for a single discount factor.
The idea of discounting time has also been proposed in the completely different context of verification [25] .
Preliminaries
We review standard concepts for two-player games. For a more detailed treatment, refer to the books by Osborne and Rubinstein [17] and Leyton-Brown and Shoham [26] .
In this paper, we only consider one-shot games of perfect information, where each player makes a single move. We represent these games in normal form as a four tuple G = (A 1 , A 2 , u 1 , u 2 ), where A i is the action space for player i. The utility function u i :
0 is a payoff function specifying the payoff that accrues to player i depending on the actions played by the two players. We consider both the simultaneous version where both players play their actions simultaneously and the sequential version where player 2 can base his action on the action taken by player 1.
As mentioned before, we assume in this paper that payoff functions are always non-negative.
Strategies describe how the player's choose their actions. A pure strategy for Player 1 is simply an element of A 1 . For simultaneous-move games, a pure strategy for player 2 is just an element of A 2 . For sequential games, a pure strategy for player 2 is a function from A 1 into A 2 . We use S i to represent the pure strategy space for player i and we extend the utility functions u i to strategies in the natural way.
A mixed strategy for a player is a probability distribution over its pure strategies. The payoff for a game using the mixed strategies is just the expected payoff when each player chooses their strategies independently from their chosen distributions.
A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) is a pair of strategies (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 such that for any s *
. A pair of strategies is an η-NE if neither player can increase its payoff by more than η by playing a different strategy, given that their opponent plays the same strategy as before. For small η, the players might be satisfied with an η-NE rather than a pure NE, since they might be indifferent to small changes in their payoff function.
A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is a pair of mixed strategies for which neither player can increase their expected payoff by playing a different mixed strategy, assuming that their opponent plays the same mixed strategy as before. The notion of an η-NE for mixed strategies is defined in an analogous way to the definition for pure strategies.
The famous theorem of Nash [27] states that every game over compact action spaces has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. When we say "Nash equilibrium" in this paper, we mean a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium unless otherwise stated.
Our Model
The normal-form representation of a game does not say anything about how a strategy is actually implemented by a player. Depending on the method of implementation used, there might be further costs incurredthe analysis of these costs may itself be game-theoretic. This insight is formalized by the notion of a metagame. Given a game G, the metagame is a new game which augments G by modeling outside factors which are relevant to playing G. Thus a metagame aims to be a more accurate model of how G might play out in the real world.
We consider the machine metagame, which presumes that a strategy is implemented by some computational process. We model the computational process as a probabilistic Turing machine, which is a very general model of computation. By the Church-Turing thesis, probabilistic Turing machines can compute any function that is effectively computable. The motivation for considering probabilistic machines is the idea that randomness is also a resource available in the real world.
In the machine metagame corresponding to a game G = (A 1 , A 2 , u 1 , u 2 ), actions for Player i are probabilistic Turing machines rather than elements of A i . Since we only consider countable strategy sets, for each i the elements of A i may be represented by binary strings in some canonical way, with each string representing a strategy and each strategy represented by a string. If a probabilistic TM played by Player 1 outputs a string x with probability p(x), this is interpreted as Player 1 playing a strategy x with probability p(x) in the game G.
Now that strategies are Turing machines, computational issues can be factored into the game, even though for a fixed game, there is no natural notion of an "input size." We address this issue by discounting each player's payoff by the time taken to produce a (representation of a) strategy. The discount factors for the two players might be different, reflecting the possibilities that the game is asymmetric between the two players, and that the two players have differing amounts of computational resources.
Given a game G = (A 1 , A 2 , u 1 , u 2 ), we formally define the (ǫ, δ)-discounted version of G. This is the discounted time machine metagame corresponding to G, where the player's computation times are discounted by 1 − ǫ and 1 − δ respectively. In this game, each player's action space is the class of all probabilistic Turing machines. Each player's Turing machine gets as input ⌈1/ǫ⌉ and ⌈1/δ⌉ in binary -this corresponds to the players having full information about the game. If the game is extensive, Player 2's Turing machine gets as additional input the output of Player 1's Turing machine.
We formally specify how payoffs are determined. We first consider the case where both player's Turing machines halt on all computation paths. Given a computation path z of a probabilistic TM, let t(z) denote the length of the computation path (i.e., the time taken by the computation), f 1 (z) ∈ A 1 the action in A 1 corresponding to the output of the path z, and f 2 (z) ∈ A 2 the action in A 2 corresponding to the output of the path z. Then the payoff u 1 (M, N ) of Player 1 corresponding to Player 1 playing a probabilistic Turing machine M and Player 2 playing N is the expectation over computation paths z and w of M and N respectively of (1 − ǫ) tz u 1 (f 1 (z), f 2 (w)). Similarly, the payoff u 2 (M, N ) of Player 2 is the expectation of
). In addition, we require a convention for payoffs on non-halting paths. In this case, a player whose machine does not halt gets payoff 0 (corresponding to discounting for infinite time), and if the other player's machine does halt, the player gets the maximum possible payoff over all actions in A 1 of playing its action, discounted by the computation time of playing its action.
We define two new equilibrium concepts, which correspond to equilibria that are robust when the discount rates ǫ and δ tend to zero. Our motivation for being interested in this limiting case is that computational costs grow smaller and smaller with time (or equivalently, computational power increases with time) -this corresponds to ǫ and δ approaching 0.
We say that a pair of probabilistic machines (M, N ) is a uniform Nash equilibrium (NE) if for every pair of
We say that (M, N ) is a strong uniform NE of the discounted game if there is a function f such that (M,
As the name indicates, the notion of a strong uniform NE is a stronger concept since it requires a fixed equilibrium strategy pair to be resilient in the limit against deviating strategies which might depend on ǫ and δ. In contrast, a uniform NE is only required to be resilient in the limit against other fixed strategies.
The definition of uniform equilibrium above assumes that ǫ and δ are independent -i.e., the equilibrium condition holds irrespective of how δ varies with ǫ, as long as they both tend to 0. In some of our results, we will be concerned with the situation where δ is a function of ǫ such that δ → 0 when ǫ → 0. We will abuse notation by referring to the corresponding notion of equilibrium, where the limit is now taken only as ǫ → 0, also as a uniform equilibrium.
We say that a payoff pair (u, v) is a uniform equilibrium payoff if there is a uniform equilibrium (M, N ) such that u 1 (M, N ) → u and u 2 (M, N ) → v in the discounted game when ǫ, δ → 0
The above equilibrium concepts are defined for pure strategy NEs, but the definitions extend easily to mixed strategy NEs.
All the definitions above can be generalized easily to N -player games for N > 2 and indeed the results of the Section 5 all hold for N -player games as well.
The Factoring Game
In our formulation of the Factoring game, the winning player receives a payoff of 2 (before discounting) and the losing player receives a payoff of 1. The precise values of these payoff are not important for our main results.
The (ǫ, δ)-discounted time version of the Factoring game is defined in the usual way. In our presentation here, we choose δ = ǫ c , for some constant c > 1. The Factoring game is naturally asymmetric. First, it is sequential: Alice chooses an number, and then Bob acts based on knowledge of Alice's number. Also, the natural application of the Factoring game is to cryptography, with Alice using a cryptosystem and Bob trying to break it. In this context, by the polynomial-time ChurchTuring thesis, the computational model Bob uses is at most polynomially faster than that of Alice.
Note that analogues of our results also go through for other dependences of δ on ǫ. The choice we make is partly intended to illustrate that our model can capture one of the typical assumptions of complexity-theoretic cryptography.
We first show that if Factoring is easy in the worst case, then every uniform NE of the discounted game yields payoff 2 to Bob.
Theorem 1
This result follows from the following lemma, which gives a tighter connection between the feasibility of Factoring and the uniform equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game. 
Proof.
We first show the existence of the claimed uniform equilibrium giving a payoff of (1, 2), and then show that this is the only uniform equilibrium payoff achievable.
The following pair of probabilistic machines (M, N ) gives a pure-strategy uniform equilibrium with payoff (1, 2). M simply outputs the number 2. N uses the trivial deterministic algorithm for Factoring running in exponential time to find a prime factorization for the number produced by M .
As ǫ → 0, the payoff for this pair of strategies tends to (1, 2) . We now show that (M, N ) is a uniform NE for the game.
Since the payoff for Bob is bounded above by 2, irrespective of what it does, it's clear that the advantage it can gain from playing a different strategy tends to zero as ǫ tends to zero. We still need to show that Alice can't do any better in the limit.
Let S be any (mixed) strategy for Alice -S is a probability distribution over probabilistic TMs. Whenever S outputs a number, player 1 gets payoff at most 1, since Bob factors the number. When S does not output a number, player 1 gets payoff 0; thus, in either case, Alice's payoff is at most 1. This shows that Alice can't do better than playing M .
Showing that (1, 2) is the only uniform equilibrium payoff possible is more involved. For the purpose of contradiction, let (a, b) be a uniform equilibrium payoff, where either a = 1 or b = 2. We derive a contradiction.
We first consider the case a = 1. It cannot be the case that a < 1, since Alice can always get payoff at least 1 in the limit by just outputting 1, irrespective of what Bob does. Thus it must be the case that 1 < a 2.
Now we show that b = 2. Let (S, T ) be a uniform NE with payoff (a, b). Let γ(ǫ) be the probability that S outputs a number with length at most 1/ǫ, where the probability is over the randomness of choosing a strategy, as well as the randomness in playing one (since a pure strategy is a probabilistic TM). We show that γ(ǫ) → 1 as ǫ → 0. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that the limit infimum of γ(ǫ) is less than α < 1. This means that we can choose ǫ arbitrarily small for which S outputs a number with length at least 1/ǫ with probability at least 1 − α. Conditioned on outputting such a number, the payoff of Alice is at most 2(1−ǫ) 1/ǫ which tends to 2/e < 1 as ǫ → 0. From the previous para, we know that Alice gets payoff at least 1 from playing S, hence from an averaging argument, we can choose ǫ arbitrarily small for which there is a probability β bounded away from 0 that Alice outputs a number of length at most 1/ǫ and gets a payoff greater than 1. We show that in this case, Bob can improve its payoff by a non-trivial amount by playing a different strategy T ′ . When defining T ′ , we use the assumption that Factoring is easy on average for all linear-time samplable distributions (note that this assumption was not used in the argument that there's a uniform equilibrium with payoff (1, 2) ). Consider the linear-time samplable distribution D on inputs of length |1/ǫ| defined as follows: Simulate S independently k/β times for 1/ǫ computation steps (where k is a constant to be decided later), and output the first number produced by S of length at most |1/ǫ|, padded up to length |1/ǫ|, outputting an arbitrary number of that length if all the runs of S give numbers that are too long. Clearly D is linear-time samplable. Here we use the fact that Factoring is paddable to any given length (padding here just involves multiplication by a power of two). There is some algorithm A that works with success probability 1 − o(1) over D, by assumption.
Consider the following strategy T ′ for Bob: it looks at the number output by Alice. If this number is at most 1/ǫ bits long, it applies A to this number. If the number is longer, it plays strategy T . The process of looking at the number and deciding what to do based on its length takes time O(1/ǫ), but if c > 1, then (1−ǫ c ) O(1/ǫ) → 1 when ǫ → 0, and hence this additive term incurs a negligible discount for Bob. Conditioned on Alice outputting a number that's at least 1/ǫ bits long, Bob's payoff is the same in the limit when playing strategy T ′ as when playing strategy T . In the other case, Bob gets a payoff of at least 2(1 − e −k ) in the limit (since he successfully factors while using (o(1/δ) time), which for large enough k is strictly better than it did when playing strategy T , given our assumption that Alice had a probability bounded away from 0 of outputting a number at most 1/ǫ bits long and getting a payoff greater than 1 (which would imply Bob got a payoff less than 2). This is a contradiction to (S, T ) being a uniform NE.
Thus, we get that γ(ǫ) → 1 as ǫ → 0. But then the strategy of Bob which simply applies the o(n c ) factoring algorithm to the number output by Alice gets a payoff of 2 in the limit. This implies that b = 2.
If a 1 and b = 2, it must be the case that (a, b) = (1, 2) for the uniform NE (S, T ), since the expected payoff of any pair of strategies in this game is bounded above by 3.
Next, we show an essentially converse. If Factoring is hard on average, then there is a uniform NE for the discounted game with payoff (2, 1).
Theorem 3 Suppose there is a linear-time samplable distribution D for which there is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm correctly factoring with success probability Ω(1) over D on inputs of length n for infinitely many n. Then for every constant c 1, there is a uniform NE for the (ǫ, ǫ c )-discounted version of the Factoring game with payoff (2, 1).
The key to the proof of Theorem 3 is in the following Lemma 4 which, similar to above, makes a stronger connection between c and the running time of a factoring algorithm. The uniform NE which we show to exist is a simple one where Alice plays a random number of length approximately 1/ǫ and Bob halts immediately without output. We show that any deviating strategy for Bob which gets him an improved payoff in the limit can be transformed into a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which factors well on average.
Lemma 4 Suppose there is no algorithm for factoring running in time n
c polylog(n) for large enough input length n, and succeeding on a Ω(1) fraction of inputs for infinitely many input lengths n. Then there is a uniform NE for the (ǫ, ǫ c )-discounted version of the Factoring game with payoff (2, 1).
Proof.
The following pair of strategies (M, N ) is a uniform NE. M selects a number of length n(ǫ) = ⌈1/ǫ⌉⌈1/ log(⌈1/ǫ⌉)⌉ at random and outputs the number. N halts immediately without output.
First we show that this gives payoff (2, 1). It's clear that the payoff for N is 1 since it halts without output. Therefore the undiscounted payoff for M is 2. We show that the discounting makes a negligible difference to this, since M doesn't need to spend too much time generating a random number of length n(ǫ). Specifically, given the number ⌈1/ǫ⌉ on its input tape, M computes n(ǫ) in unary and stores it on a separate tape -this can be done in time O(n(ǫ)). It then generates a random number on the output tape, using the computed value of n(ǫ) to ensure the number is of the right length. The total time taken by M is O(n(ǫ)) = O(1/(ǫ log(1/ǫ))), and the discounting due to this is (1 − ǫ) O(n(ǫ)) , which is 1 in the limit as ǫ → 0.
Next we show (M, N ) is a uniform NE. Alice has payoff bounded above by 2 for any strategy it plays, so clearly it cannot do better with a different strategy S. The bulk of the work is showing that Bob cannot do better.
Suppose, on the contrary that there is a strategy T for Bob such that the strategy pair (M, T ) yields payoff at least 1 + γ for Bob for arbitrarily small ǫ, where γ > 0. We show how to extract from T an algorithm that factors efficiently on average on infinitely many input lengths.
Choose a infinite sequence ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 . . . such that for each i, 1 i ∞, the strategy pair (M, T ) yields payoff at least 1 + γ for Bob in the (ǫ i , ǫ c i )-discounted game, and n(ǫ i ) > n(ǫ i−1 ). Such a sequence exists by the assumption that (M, N ) is not a uniform NE.
We show that there must exist a pure strategy N for Bob such that there is an infinite set I for which (M, N ) yields payoff at least 1 + γ/2 for Bob for all ǫ i such that i ∈ I. This argument takes advantage of the fact that the Factoring game has payoffs bounded above by 2. By a Markov argument, it must be the case for each i ∈ N that the pure strategies in the support of T which yield payoff at least 1 + γ/2 must have probability weight at least γ/2. Now, if each pure strategy only yields payoff at least 1 + γ/2 finitely often, then we can choose i large enough so that the pure strategies yielding payoff at least 1 + γ/2 in the (ǫ i , ǫ c i )-discounted game have probability weight less than γ/2 in the support of the mixed strategy T , which is a contradiction.
Let B = {n(ǫ i ), i = 1 ∈ I}. B is an infinite set, by assumption.
We use N to define a probabilistic algorithm A for solving Factoring well on average on all large enough input lengths in B, contradicting the assumption of the theorem. Given an number x of length n, A simply runs N on x log(n) times independently, halting each run after time n c ⌈log(n) c+2 ⌉. If any of these runs outputs numbers y 1 and y 2 such that y 1 * y 2 = x, A outputs these numbers, otherwise it outputs nothing. The running time of A is O(n c log(n) c+3 ). We prove that for at least an Ω(1) fraction of strings of length n for infinitely many n, A factors correctly with probability 1 − o (1) .
The idea is to analyze the payoff for Bob from the strategy (M, N ), and show that an expected payoff greater than 1 means that a significant fraction of computation paths must halt quickly and factor correctly. Given a number x of length n(ǫ) ∈ B and a computation path z of N when given x, let I xz = 1 if path z terminates in a correct factoring of x and 0 otherwise, t xz be the time taken along path z, and p xz be the probability of taking path z. We have that, for any
txz , where δ = ǫ c . Then the payoff of Bob is Σ x f (x)/2 n(ǫ) . By assumption, this quantity is at least 1 + γ/2. By a Markov argument, this implies that for at least a γ/4 fraction of strings x of length n(ǫ), f (x) 1 + γ/4.
Fix any such x. We classify the computation paths z for the computation of N on x into three classes. The first is the set of z for which I xz = 0. This set contributes at most
The next class is the set of z for which I xz = 1 and t xz 2 log(1/δ)/δ. This set contributes at most (1), where Z is the set of z for which I xz = 1 and t xz < 2 log(1/δ)/δ.
This means that with probability at least γ/4 over strings x of size n(ǫ) ∈ B, N halts in time at most 2 log(1/δ)/δ and outputs factors of x with probability at least γ/4−o(1). This implies that for all large enough n ∈ B, with probability at least γ/4 − o(1) over numbers of size n, N halts in time at most n c ⌈log(n) c+2 ⌉ and factors x with probability at least γ/4 − o(1) (we're simply upper bounding the time as a function of n rather than of δ).
Since A amplifies the success probability of N by running it log(n) times independently, the success probability of A is at least 1 − o(1) on a Ω(1) fraction of inputs, for infinitely many input lengths.
Essentially the same proof gives a more general version of Lemma 4 -if there is some linear-time samplable distribution D such that no probabilistic algorithm running in time n c polylog(n) achieves an Ω(1) success probability for Factoring over D, then there is a uniform Nash equilibrium for the (ǫ, ǫ c )-discounted Factoring game achieving a limit payoff of (2, 1). The only difference is that M plays a random number selected according to D, and we argue with respect to this distribution rather than with respect to the uniform distribution when defining the factoring algorithm A. Theorem 3 follows immediately from this more general version.
Unlike in the case of Lemma 2, this is not the only uniform Nash equilibrium when Factoring is hard. Indeed, an examination of the proof of Lemma 2 shows that we did not actually use the assumption when showing there was a uniform NE with payoff (1, 2) ; the assumption was only to prove the second part of the theorem. Thus, even when Factoring is hard, there is a uniform NE with payoff (1, 2) .
However, an important point to note is that the discounted Factoring game is a sequential game, where Alice plays first. Thus, even though there might be a uniform NE with payoff (1, 2), Alice can control which Nash equilibrium is reached, and it is natural for it to select the equilibrium giving it a higher payoff. The key question in the discounted Factoring game is whether there exists a uniform NE giving Alice a payoff greater than 1 -Lemma 2 shows that when Factoring is easy, there isn't, and Lemma 4 shows that when Factoring is hard on average, there is. This is somewhat related to the notion of subgame-perfect equilibria in traditional game theory [26] . It's an interesting challenge to define an appropriate notion of subgame-perfection for our model which could also be used in a variation of our model where both Alice and Bob are discounted by the total time taken by the two of them.
If one interprets Alice getting a payoff higher than 1 as Player 1 "winning" the game, this result is in close accordance with intuition. Alice wins the game if and only if Factoring is hard. In practice, Factoring is believed to be hard, and therefore in practice, we expect Alice to win the game, and not Bob as traditional game theory would predict.
The uniform equilibrium in the statement of Lemma 2 yielding a payoff of (1, 2) is in fact also a strong uniform equilibrium -this follows easily from the proof. Can Alice hope for a strong uniform equilibrium yielding it a payoff of 2 in the case that Factoring is hard? The answer is no. Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of the second part of Lemma 2, except that we can no longer use the assumption that Factoring is in polynomial time. But we can use an alternate strategy N ǫ for Bob which plays the role of the factoring algorithm in the proof of Lemma 2.
N ǫ simply implements a look-up table, which stores the numbers which S may output, along with their factors. N ǫ need only store numbers of length 1/ǫ, together with their factors. The key is that just by encoding the look-up table in its state machine, N ǫ can find the factors of the number output by S in time O(1/ǫ), and since δ = o(ǫ), this means that the discount factor is 1 in the limit. The rest of the argument is the same as in the proof of the second part of Theorem 2.
Of course the dependence of the strategy of Bob on ǫ is essential, since we know that there is a uniform equilibrium yielding Alice a payoff of 2 in the limit. Moreover, the proof illustrates why the notion of a strong uniform NE might be too strong an equilibrium conceptBob can push Alice's limit payoff down to 1, but the proof involves it playing strategies whose sizes grow exponentially in 1/ǫ! For small values of ǫ, this is clearly infeasible.
The issue here is that there is a tradeoff between hardware and time. Computations can be made very efficient by exponentially increasing hardware, but in the physical world, both hardware and time are costly. Our model explicitly captures the idea of time being costly through discounting, but the expense of hardware is captured implicitly in the uniform equilibrium concept.
There are other ways of defining equilibrium concepts which can capture the cost of hardware in a more explicit manner. For instance, we could define an f (ǫ, δ)-resilient uniform NE as a uniform NE where no player gains in the limit by playing a pure strategy whose size is bounded by f (ǫ, δ). Since a pure strategy is just a probabilistic Turing machine, "size" has a natural representation -it's the number of bits required to explicitly present the state space, transition function and alphabet of the Turing machine. A uniform NE as we define it an O(1)-resilient uniform NE, while strong uniform NE are f (ǫ, δ)-resilient uniform NE for f arbitrarily large. Now let us consider f (ǫ, δ)-resilient NE where δ is polynomially bounded in ǫ, and f is polynomially bounded in 1/ǫ. By using essentially the proof of Theorem 4, as well as the fact that a probabilistic Turing machine of size K and operating in time T can be simulated by a probabilistic Boolean circuit of size O(K + T ) 2 , we get that there there is an f (ǫ, δ)-resilient uniform NE giving Alice a payoff of 2 in the limit, unless Factoring can be solved correctly by polynomial-size circuits on an Ω(1) fraction of inputs, for large enough input lengths.
Thus, not only does is the difference between feasibility and infeasibility of factoring captured by a difference in the structure of equilibria for the Factoring game, but by a natural modification of the notion of uniformity, we can capture the difference between uniformity and non-uniformity! This raises the possibility that there might be interesting concrete complexity notions that might be captured by game theory as wellwe need not restrict attention to what happens in the limit as ǫ → 0. Perhaps there are novel notions of complexity that can be extracted from the game-theoretic viewpoint, which give a better understanding of the gap between finite complexity and asymptotic complexity?
We conclude this section by discussing our choice of parameters for the Factoring game, and showing that the results are robust to the choices we make. First, we examine the payoffs. Any choice of payoffs which are all positive and for which Bob gets strictly more (resp. Alice gets strictly less) if Bob succeeds in factoring will yield essentially equivalent results.
Second, we discuss the discount factors. Our choice of dependence of δ on ǫ was made to illustrate nicely the correspondence between infeasibility and the existence of equilibria yielding Alice a high payoff. But the polynomiality of the dependence is not critical to our proofs -in general, if 1/δ = f (1/ǫ) for some function f , then our results hold when feasibility means solvability in time o(f (n)) and infeasibility means unsolvability on average in time slightly more than f (n).
In the special case that δ = ǫ, we get that Alice has a winning strategy under the natural assumption that Factoring is not in quasi-linear time on average.
Properties of Discounted Time Games
The most fundamental results in a theory of games of a given form concern existence of equilibria. Here we prove a couple of results of this form. The first result shows that the concept of uniform equilibrium for the discounted version of a finite game corresponds nicely to the concept of Nash equilibrium for the original game. The second result complements this by showing that discounted games might have equilibria that the original game does not possess.
We show that any Nash equilibrium in a finite game G translates to a strong uniform Nash equilibrium yielding the same uniform payoff in the discounted version of G.
Theorem 6 Let G be a finite two-player game. Given any Nash equilibrium (S, T ) of G, there is a strong uniform Nash equilibrium (S
′ , T ′ ) of the discounted version of G which yields the same payoff in the limit as ǫ, δ → 0.
Proof. We assume that G is a finite two-player game in normal form. If G is sequential and given in extensive form, we just consider the image normal-form game, which is known to inherit its equilibria from the sequential game.
Let (S, T ) be a (possibly mixed-strategy) NE of G. We define a strategy pair (S ′ , T ′ ) for the discounted version of G, and argue that this is a strong uniform Nash equilibrium for the discounted version, with the same payoffs for both players in the limit. Given any pure strategy s 1 of a player in G, choose in an arbitrary way a Turing machine M s1 which ignores its input and halts after outputting a representation of s 1 . If S gives probability p 1 to strategy s 1 , then we give machine M s1 probability p 1 in S ′ . T ′ is defined in an analogous way given T .
The key point is that irrespective of the way the representative machines for strategies are chosen, they are guaranteed to halt in finite time. As δ and ǫ approach zero, the discount factors approach one, and hence the payoff in the discounted game from playing (S ′ , T ′ ) approaches the payoff from playing (S, T ) in G.
It still remains to be shown that (S ′ , T ′ ) is an η-NE for the discounted game, where η → 0 when ǫ, δ → 0.
This would imply that (S ′ , T ′ ) is a strong uniform NE for the discounted game. We show that player 1 cannot gain a significant advantage from playing a different mixed strategy S ′ 1 -the analogous result holds for Player 2 as well.
Any mixed strategy S ′ 1 in the discounted game can be transformed into a mixed strategy S 1 in G -each pure strategy is given the same probability of being played in G as it has of being output by a probabilistic TM in the discounted game (the probability weight of non-halting computation paths is assigned to an arbitrary strategy in S 1 ). Because of the discounting, the payoff that Player 1 can get by playing S ′ 1 in the discounted game is at most the payoff that he can get by playing S 1 in G. But the payoff by playing S in G is at least the payoff by playing S 1 in G, and the payoff by playing S ′ in the discounted game approaches the payoff by playing S in G as ǫ, δ → 0. This shows that the advantage of playing S ′ 1 in the discounted game must tend to zero as ǫ, δ tend to zero, for an arbitrary S ′ 1 , implying that (S ′ , T ′ ) is a strong uniform NE for the discounted game.
Consider the Largest Integer Game where both players simultaneously play integers. The player playing the largest integer receives a payoff of 100 with each receiving 50 if they play the same integer. This game has no Nash equilibrium or even an almost Nash equilibrium (Nash's theorem doesn't apply because the action space is not compact).
Next we show that almost-NEs exist, not only for the Largest Integer game for but any countable game with bounded payoffs. The basic idea of the proof is to approximate the discounted countable game by a finite game, and then reduce the existence of uniform equilibria in the discounted countable game to the existence of NEs in the corresponding finite game. Proof. Let G be as stated in the theorem, and let K 1 be an upper bound on payoffs for G. Consider the (ǫ, δ)-discounted time version of G. We show how to approximate the discounted game by a finite game G ǫ,δ and then use the existence of Nash equilibria in the finite game to show the existence of approximate Nash equilibria in the discounted game.
The finite game G ǫ,δ is the subgame of the discounted game where the first player plays probabilistic Turing machines of description size at most 2
2K
2 /ǫ 2 , and the second player plays probabilistic Turing machines of size at most 2
2 . By Nash's theorem, this game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (S 1 , T 1 ). We show that (S 1 , T 1 ) is an (ǫ + δ)-NE for the discounted game.
We show that for any mixed strategy pair (S, T ) in the discounted game, there is a mixed strategy pair
This implies that any NE for G ǫ,δ is an (ǫ + δ)-NE for the discounted game.
Let (S, T ) be a mixed strategy pair in the discounted game. We show how to construct a strategy T ′ in G ǫ,δ for Player 2 such that u 2 (S, T ′ ) u 2 (S, T ) − δ. The corresponding result for Player 1 follows by a symmetric argument.
The argument is a "probability-shifting" argumentwe will show how to transfer probability from probabilistic machines in the support of T with size more than 2
2 /δ 2 to probabilistic machines with description size smaller than that number without damaging the payoff of Player 2 too much. Specifically, the payoff of Player 2 will not decrease by more than δ conditional on that strategy being played, and hence there will not be more than a δ decrease in total. Let N be a probabilistic machine of size more than 2
2 /δ 2 which has non-zero weight in T . We define a corresponding machine N ′ of size at most 2
and transfer all the probability weight of N to N ′ in T ′ . Essentially, N ′ will be indistinguishable from N relative to the discounting.
The key observation is that we don't need to take into account computation paths in N of length greater than K 2 /δ 2 , because the strategies output on such computation paths are so radically discounted that we may as well assume they yield zero payoff, without incurring too much damage to the overall payoff. N ′ behaves like N "truncated" to K 2 /δ 2 steps, outputting a strategy for G if N does within that time, and looping otherwise.
We cannot simply simulate N using a universal machine and a clock, since the simulation takes too much of a time overhead and does not preserve the payoff to within a small additive overhead. Instead we simulate N in hardware -this is much more time efficient. Specifically, we're interested in the behavior of N only for the first K 2 /δ 2 time steps. We can define a Turing machine N ′ with description size at most 2
which encodes the relevant behavior of N ′ entirely in its finite state control. This simulation incurs no time overhead at all. Now, we calculate the maximum damage to Player 2's payoff from playing N ′ instead of N . There is no damage to the payoff from computation paths of N which terminate within K 2 /δ 2 steps. Thus the loss in payoff is bounded above by (1 − δ)
2 K, which is at most δ if K 1. This finishes the argument.
In case the payoffs of the game G are computable, we get a stronger version of Theorem 7 in that uniform equilibria are guaranteed to exist. Proof Sketch. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7, but we take advantage of the fact that payoffs are computable. As in the proof of Theorem 7, we can define a finite truncated version of the game such that the almost-Nash equilibria of the truncated game are also almost-Nash equilibria of the discounted game. In order to ensure uniformity, however, we have to produce a fixed pair of strategies such that as ǫ, δ → 0, neither can gain a non-zero amount in the limit by using a different strategy.
The basic idea is to define a strategy pair (M, N ) such that M and N deterministically compute an almost-Nash equilibrium of the truncated game, with M proceeding to play the strategy of player 1 in the computed almost-Nash equilibrium, and N proceeding to play the strategy of player 2. There are two obstacles to this approach. The first is the computational obstacle, but this can be circumvented since the entries of the payoff matrix for the truncated game can be estimated to any desired accuracy using sampling and the computability of the payoffs of the original game, and then the Lemke-Howson algorithm [28] can be used to find almost-equilibria of the truncated game.
The second obstacle is that computing an almostNash equilibrium of the truncated game incurs a substantial time overhead, which already drives the payoffs of the two players down before they play the strategies corresponding to the almost-Nash equilibrium, not to mention the simulation overhead from using a single machine (M or N ) to find an almost-Nash equilibrium for all ǫ, δ > 0. This obstacle is overcome using the idea of "miniaturization" -given discount rates ǫ and δ respectively, the players pretend that their discount rates are ǫ ′ and δ ′ instead, where 1/ǫ ′ and 1/δ ′ grow very slowly as a function of 1/ǫ and 1/δ. ǫ ′ and δ ′ are chosen so that the players can compute an almost-Nash equilibrium of the (ǫ ′ , δ ′ )-discounted game quickly enough that their payoffs in the (ǫ, δ)-discounted game are hardly affected by this computation, and that playing the strategies for the truncated game takes relatively little time as well. The point is that this is still an (ǫ ′ + δ ′ )-NE for the discounted game, and that ǫ ′ , δ ′ → 0 as ǫ, δ → 0. Hence it is a uniform Nash equilibrium.
The bounded-payoff assumption in Theorems 7 and 8 is essential for the conclusion to hold. Indeed, consider the two-player game where Player 1 derives a payoff of 2 i from playing integer i and Player 2 a payoff of 2 j from playing integer j. It is not hard to see that this game does not even have almost-NEs in the discounted game.
Theorem 7 shows that the discounted version of the Largest Integer Game does have almost-NEs. For the Largest Integer game, in fact, there is a strong uniform equilibrium which yields a payoff of 0 for both players, and every uniform equilibrium gives payoff 0 to both players in the limit. This is intuitive: the Largest Integer game is a game of oneupmanship, where each player tries to outdo the other by producing a larger number. In the process, they exhaust their computational resources (or alternatively, end up spending an inordinate amount of time) and end up with nothing.
In general, uniform equilibrium is a strong notion of equilibrium, since there should be no gain in deviating irrespective of how ǫ, δ → 0. Suppose we know more about the relationship of ǫ and δ, say that δ < ǫ 2 , i.e., Player 2 always has more computational power. In this case there are equilibria in which Player 2 wins, say by outputting 2(1 − ǫ) 3/2 while Player 1 outputs (1 − ǫ) 3/2 . This is again in accordance with intuition -if the players are asymmetric, the more patient/computational stronger player should win this game (the discount rate can be seen, depending on the situation, as either an index of patience or of computational power).
